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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO
09/781,920	02/12/2001	Gregory Hagan Moulton	UND007 9074	
7:	590 09/08/2005		EXAMINER	
William J. Kubida, Esq.			JUNG, DAVID YIUK	
Hogan & Hartson, LLP Suite 1500			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
1200 17th Street Denver, CO 80202			2134	
			DATE MAILED: 09/08/2005	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

<b>1</b>					
	Application No.	Applicant(s)			
Advisory Action	09/781,920	MOULTON, GREGORY HAGAN			
Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief	Examiner	Art Unit			
	David Y. Jung	2134			
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence address			
THE REPLY FILED <u>20 July 2005</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.					
<ol> <li>The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or o this application, applicant must timely file one of the folloplaces the application in condition for allowance; (2) a No. (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in comp following time periods:</li> </ol>	owing replies: (1) an amendment, a otice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in liance with 37 CFR 1.114. The repl	ffidavit, or other evidence, which compliance with 37 CFR 41.31; or			
a) The period for reply expires months from the mailing of		a final rejection, whichever is later. In no			
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.					
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).					
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension a CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened sta above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three month earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).  NOTICE OF APPEAL	and the corresponding amount of the fee. atutory period for reply originally set in the	The appropriate extension fee under 37 final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b)			
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in compliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be filed within two months of the date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR 41.37(a).  AMENDMENTS					
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection,  (a) They raise new issues that would require further co  (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo  (c) They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or	nsideration and/or search (see NO ow);	TE below);			
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).	· -	jected claims.			
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.1		ompliant Amendment (PTOL-324).			
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):					
6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).					
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) will not be entered, or b) will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended. The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: none. Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: all. Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:					
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE					
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, b because applicant failed to provide a showing of good ar and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).</li> </ol>					
The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will <u>not</u> be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1).					
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	on of the status of the claims after e	entry is below or attached.			
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered bu see attached.	at does NOT place the application i	n condition for allowance because:			

13. Other: \_\_\_\_.

12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper No(s). 8/2005

## **ADVISORY ACTION CONTNUED**

## Allowable Subject Matter

Arguments presented show that Applicant refers to a concept that is different from Gdiff. Nevertheless, the Office, after an unusually careful consideration, disagrees with Applicant as to the allowability of the particular claims as presented and argued by Applicant. One of the issues appears to be the narrowness of the reading of the claims. As shall be stated again in later sections, although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Policy behind this line of case is: The claim language must clearly define the limits of the claims.

## Response to Arguments

Starting from page 9 of the After Final Response, Applicant argued that 1) the Gdlff reference does not show a lexicon. 2) the Gdiff reference teaches something opposite the claimed lexicon; 3) the digital sequence contained in the Gdiff does not correspond to the claimed unique identifier 4) Gdiff is not a method for symbolic exchange.

First, does the Gdlff reference not show a lexicon? Gdiff's differences shows a correspondence between the difference and the versions. Is this a lexicon? The word lexicon can reasonably be read to be broader than the Applicant wishes to mean. In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of

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applicant's invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., lexicon being a particular type of symbolic identifiers) are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See *In re Van Geuns*, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Policy behind this line of case is: The claim language must clearly define the limits of the claims. Which type of symbolic identifiers is being referred? Why is this particular type not more particularly recited in the rejected claims?

Second, does the Gdiff reference teach something opposite the claimed lexicon? Gdiff teaches an identifier. The difference between versions is an identifier. Applicant argues (at page 11), that the claimed invention, by transmitting a unique identifier in lieu of the digital sequences is opposite of Gdiff. Yet, the difference of Gdiff is being transmitted in lieu of the actual versions themselves.

Third, does the digital sequence contained in the Gdiff not correspond to the claimed unique identifier? Perhaps this is so. In response to applicant's argument that the Gdiff not correspond to the claimed unique identifier, the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the ordinary skill in the art; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. See *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981).

Fourth, is Gdiff not a method for symbolic exchange? What is symbolic? In a broader sense (broader than Applicant wishes), being symbolic refers to something

being used in lieu of something else so as to transfer the semantic content to that

something else. The difference of Gdiff is being transmitted in lieu of the actual

versions themselves. Thus, Applicant wishes to use the word "symbolic" in a narrower

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sense. Yet, the claim language must clearly define the limits of the claims. Which type

of symbolic exchange is being referred? Why is this particular type not more particularly

recited in the rejected claims?

Conclusion

The art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's

disclosure. The art disclosed general background.

Points of Contact

Any response to this action should be mailed to:

Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks

Washington, D.C. 20231

or faxed to:

(571) 273-8300, (for formal communications intended for entry)

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Or:

(703) 746-5606 (for informal or draft communications, please label "PROPOSED" or "DRAFT")

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to David Jung whose telephone number is (571) 272-3836 or Greg Morse whose telephone number is (571) 272-3838.

**David Jung** 

Patent Examiner

9/3/05